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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, a number of linguists, dissatisfied with
the tendency of generative theory toward increasingly abstract principles
and away from specific rules and constructions, have offered as an alter-
native to generativism what is often called ‘construction grammar’. Adele
Goldberg (1995, 2003) is a major proponent of construction grammar. Gold-
berg (2003:219) offers seven ‘basic tenets’ of construction grammar that
are ‘shared by most constructionist approaches’ (emphasis added):
Tenet 1. All levels of description are understood to involve pair-
ings of form with semantic or discourse function, including mor-
phemes or words, idioms, partially lexically filled and fully abstract
phrasal patterns.
Tenet 3. [N]o underlying levels of syntax or any phonologically
empty elements are posited.
Tenet 4. Constructions are understood to be learned on the ba-
sis of the input and general cognitive mechanisms (they are con-
structed), and are expected to vary cross−linguistically.
Where Do Constructional Meanings
Come From?
Kevin R. GREGG
－２５－
Tenet 5. Cross−linguistic generalizations are explained by ap-
peal to general cognitive constraints together with the functions of
the constructions involved.
Tenet 7. The totality of our knowledge of language is captured
by a network of constructions.
Note that some major claims are being made here:1) Where mainstream
theory sees syntax as a function mapping sound onto meaning, construc-
tion grammar has a direct association between the two.2) On the other
hand, and somewhat confusingly perhaps, ‘construction’ includes abstract
phrasal patterns which themselves do not have phonetic form.3) There is
no language faculty as such; nothing corresponding to Universal Grammar
in generative theory. These are all clearly controversial claims, of course,
but here I want to limit myself to the idea of abstract constructions, like
the ditransitive construction, having meaning.
In what follows, I propose to examine in some detail two construc-
tions, the ditransitive construction (give Mary a book, bake Max a cake)
and the caused motion construction (laugh him off the stage, sprinkle salt
on the meat), two parade cases Goldberg offers of aspects of English gram-
mar that can be elegantly explained without appealing to an independent
syntactic level. I will take Goldberg’s examples, look at the various con-
straints she feels compelled to posit to account for the facts, and show how
her account fails across the board. I will then claim, without attempting
to make the claim good, that similar analyses would undermine similar
claims about other constructions.
2. The ditransitive construction
The ditransitive construction, or the double NP (‘NP NP’) construc-
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tion, has two object NPs with a transitive verb: Subject−Verb−Object1−
Object2 (Goldberg 2003, p.221), the first object NP being traditionally
known as the indirect object. In some cases, the ditransitive construction
(NP NP) alternates with the NP PP construction.
1) ditransitive (NP NP) construction
a. John gave Mary a book.
b. Max baked Fred a cake.
2) NP PP construction
a. John gave a book to Mary.
b. Max baked a cake for Fred.
According to Goldberg, the ‘central sense’ of the ditransitive construc-
tion is ‘successful transfer of an object to a recipient’ (1995:33). This basic
sense licenses a number of ‘extended senses’ (1995:38).
3) basic sense
X (Subject) transfers Y (Indirect Object) to Z (Direct Object)
4) extended senses
a. X enables Y to receive Z (allowed her a break)
b. X intends Y to receive Z (baked her a cake)
c. X acts to cause Y to receive Z later (bequeathed her the estate)
d. X causes Y NOT to receive Z (denied him the chance)
e. ‘conditions of satisfaction imply’ that X causes Y to receive Z (owe
him a bundle)
2.1 semantic constraints on the ditransitive construction
As is well known, the NP NP form does not alternate freely with the
NP PP form, and Goldberg takes the former to be constrained by various
semantic considerations. There seem to be exceptions, as we will see, but
Goldberg argues that seeming exceptions are in fact metaphorical uses of
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the construction.
2.1.1 volitionality of the agent
The first constraint is that the subject must be a volitional agent.
Further, ‘the action described by the verb [must be] performed agentively,
but also with the relevant transfer intended’ (p.143). Thus in (5), ‘Joe
must be understood to intend to give the picture to Sally. It cannot be the
case that Joe painted the picture for someone else and later happened to
give it to Sally’ (p.143). (Unless otherwise indicated, example sentences
are from Goldberg 1995 and are marked with a ‘G’. Judgments are Gold-
berg’s.)
5) Joe painted Sally a picture. (G3)
By the same token, (6−8) are ill−formed, because the actions indicated
by the verbs were not performed intentionally; at least, not with the spe-
cific intention of achieving the action expressed by the sentence.
6) *Joe threw the right fielder the ball he had intended the first base-
man to catch.
7) *Hal brought his mother a cake since he didn’t eat it on the way.
8) *Joe took Sam a package by leaving it in his trunk where Sam later
found it. (G5−7)
9) #In an attempt to injure Chris, Pat threw Chris the ball. (p.35,
G18)
(Goldberg doesn’t explain the difference between * and #; evidently, the
former sentences are ungrammatical in some sense, where the latter is
only ‘infelicitous’.)
Now there are, as Goldberg recognizes, cases where the subject is
either inanimate, hence not volitional, or else a human agent but the re-
sult indicated in the sentence is not intended. For example:
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10) a. The medicine brought him some relief.
b. She gave me the flu.
c. The music lent the party a festive air. (G12)
But these are not problematical, says Goldberg, as they are all ‘instances
of a particular conventional systematic metaphor, namely,” causal events
as transfers”. This metaphor involves understanding causing an effect in
an entity as transferring the effect construed as an object, to that entity’
(p.144).
2.1.2 constraints on the recipient (first object)
It has long been noted that the ditransitive construction (NP NP) re-
quires (or at least implies) that the recipient NP refer to an animate entity
(again, with ‘metaphorical’ exceptions like (10c) above). Hence the well
−known contrast in such pairs as (11).
11) a. Max threw a ball to Tim / Tim a ball.
b. Max threw a ball to the wall / *the wall a ball.
Beyond this, Goldberg adds that ‘the first object be understood to be a bene-
ficiary, or a willing recipient’ (p.146). This constraint is offered as an ex-
planation of the unacceptability of sentences like those in (12).
12) a. *Sally burned Joe some rice. (G17; taken from Green 1974)
b. *Bill told Mary a story, but she wasn’t listening. (G18)
c. *Bill threw the coma victim a blanket. (G19)
2.2 problems
Unfortunately, violations of the putative constraints on the ditransi-
tive are all too easy to find.
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2.2.1 transfer
In arguing that the ditransitive construction ‘contributes semantics
not attributable to the lexical items involved’ (p.141), Goldberg offers this
example:
13) Sally baked her sister a cake. (G1)
According to Goldberg, ‘This expression can only mean that Sally
baked a cake with the intention of giving it to her sister. It cannot mean
that Sally baked the cake so that her sister wouldn’t have to bake it; nor
can it mean that Sally baked the cake as a demonstration of cake−baking,
or that she baked a cake for herself because her sister wanted her to have
one. Unless we associate the “intended transfer” aspect of meaning to the
construction, we are forced to say that bake itself means something like
‘X intends to cause Y to receive Z by baking” ’ (p.141). The logic behind
the argument is that since the sentence has the meaning it has, and since
that meaning can’t be derived from the verb (bake implies nothing what-
ever about transfer), it must be derived from the construction itself.
But for this argument to go through, first of all it would be necessary
that a sentence like (13) does in fact have to have the meaning Goldberg
attributes to it. But it doesn’t. Consider, for instance, (14).
14) Sally baked the judges a cake that knocked their socks off.
That is, Sally ‘baked the cake as a demonstration of cake−baking’, to use
Goldberg’s words. Certainly the normal, almost inevitable interpretation
of (13) is Goldberg’s ‘only’ interpretation. But the construction of (13) is
identical to that of (14), where there is no intention of giving the cake to
the judges. Similarly with (5) above: Joe could have painted the picture
to impress Sally, say, not to give it to her.
And of course the verbs themselves are volitional; one doesn’t inadver-
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tently bake a cake or paint a picture. Thus the normal interpretation――
for Goldberg, the necessary interpretation―― is invited with equal force
in the NP PP construction:
15) a. Sally baked a cake for her sister.
b. Joe painted a picture for Sally.
And conversely, (16) is odd in the NP PP construction as well as in the
NP NP:
16) ?Joe threw the ball to the right fielder that he had intended the
first baseman to catch.
Further, note that adding, say, ‘inadvertently’, makes (6−8) perfectly
acceptable:
17) a. Joe inadvertently threw the right fielder the ball he had intended
the first baseman to catch.
b. Hal inadvertently brought his mother a cake since he didn’t eat
it on the way home.
c. Joe inadvertently took Sam a package by leaving it in his trunk
where Sam later found it.
Contrast these with cases where volition really does seem to be entailed,
not merely invited:
18) *Max inadvertently decided / considered / tortured ... Similarly,
with (19−20):
19) Pat threw Chris the ball.
20) Pat hit Chris the ball. (G16−17, p.35)
Goldberg claims that ‘these examples cannot be interpreted to mean that
Pat threw or hit the ball at Chris. They can only mean that Pat threw or
hit the ball so that Chris would receive it ... Consequently, we cannot fe-
licitously say:
21) #In an attempt to injure Chris, Pat threw Chris the ball.’ (G18,
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p.35)
But this is false: Pat may have known about Chris’s old back injury, or
Chris may have been carrying a beehive at that moment, or God knows
what other circumstances could have been consistent with Pat gently lob-
bing the ball to Chris, with the intent, not that Chris catch the ball, but
rather that Chris be harmed. In the same way, (22−23) are perfectly pos-
sible, and on the other hand, (24) is infelicitous:
22) Pat hit Chris a ball she knew he couldn’t handle.
23) In an attempt to injure Chris, Pat threw Chris the grenade.
24) ?In an attempt to injure Chris, Pat flung a marshmallow at him.
Intended transfer to a recipient by a volitional agent is, of course, the stan-
dard interpretation of sentences like (19) or (20), and since intended trans-
fer is normally inconsistent with an attempt to injure the recipient, (21)
does, of course, sound odd. But the (in) felicity is in the sentence, not
the construction; a point that is reinforced by noting that the relevant im-
plicatures of (19−23) remain the same in the NP PP construction.
2.2.2 animacy of the recipient
Of course, recipients are in general animates, so it would not be that
surprising if the ditransitive construction was restricted to cases where
the first object is animate. But in fact it is not so restricted, as Goldberg
herself points out.
25) a. The paint job gave the car a higher sale price.
b. The tabasco sauce gave the baked beans some flavor.
c. The music lent the party a festive air. (G14−16, p.146)
d. The minerals give the lake its characteristic color.
e. The flood brought the dam more water than it could retain.
In these sentences neither the subjects nor the first objects are animate,
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and of course the subjects cannot intend the transfer; and yet the sentences
are all impeccable. These would seem, then, to be prima facie countere-
vidence to Goldberg’s proposed constraints.
Goldberg’s explanation is that these are metaphoric extensions of the
construction: ‘In none of these examples is the first object an animate be-
ing; however, in the source domain of the metaphor the affected party is
understood to be a recipient, and thus indeed an animate being. Again
we find that a constraint can be satisfied in the source but not the target
domain of the metaphor’ (p.146) In other words, so far as I can make out,
since it’s OK to say ‘I lent him $5,’ it’s OK to say (25c), even though nei-
ther the music nor the party is animate, and even though there is no trans-
fer of a festive air. I find this less than compelling. Why, for instance,
can we not say *Max threw the wall a ball if we can say, e.g. (25a−e)?
2.2.3 willingness of the recipient
Goldberg takes the unacceptability of the sentences in (12) above to
be evidence that the recipient of the transfer must be a willing recipient.
Thus, for instance, (12a), repeated below as (26), would be all right if
Joe likes burned rice.
26) Sally burned Joe some rice.
But Joe’s tastes don’t enter into the question, and there’s no reason to think
that the ditransitive construction implies, let alone entails, willingness;
as in (27).
27) Sally cooked Joe some really awful−tasting rice.
3. The caused motion construction
Goldberg defines the caused motion construction structurally as fol-
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[SUBJ [V OBJ OBL]]
where V is a nonstative verb, and OBL is a directional phrase (p.152).
Semantically, ‘the causer argument directly [sic] causes the theme argu-
ment to move along a path designated by the directional phrase’ (p.152).
Thus we have sentences such as the following, taken from Goldberg (p.152):
28) They laughed the poor guy out of the room.
29) Frank sneezed the tissue off the table.
30) Mary urged Bill into the house.
31) Sue let the water out of the bathtub.
32) Sam helped him into the car.
33) They sprayed the paint onto the wall.
In each case the subject, by laughing (sneezing, etc.) directly causes the
poor guy (the tissue, etc.) to move out of the room (off the table, etc.).
This ‘basic semantics’ of the construction allows for a small set of related
interpretations (pp.161−162):
34) a. X causes Y to MOVE Z (where Z is a direction)
Max pushed/kicked/shoved Martha out of the room.
Goldberg considers this the ‘central sense of the construction’ (p.162).
b. X does such that (a.) would be satisfied
Max ordered/asked/invited/urged Martha out of the room.
c. X enables Y to MOVE Z
Max let/allowed Martha out of the room.
d. X prevents Y from MOVING Z
Max locked Martha into the room.
Sam barricaded him out of the room. (G44)
e. X helps Y to MOVE Z
Max helped Martha into the room.
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Sam walked him to the car. (G57)
One might want to quibble about whether, say, (d) expresses caused mo-
tion, but I’m not going to. The important question is whether one can ar-
gue, as Goldberg does, that the construction itself has one or another of
these meanings, independent of the specific sentences exemplifying them.
One problem, as Goldberg points out, is that there seems to be a good
deal of idiosyncrasy in the verbs that can be used in this construction.
For instance, Goldberg offers these pairs (G53−56):
35) a. Pat coaxed him into the room.
b. *Pat encouraged him into the room.
36) a. He hit the ball over the fence.
b. *He struck the ball over the fence.
37) a. Please chop the kindling into the bin provided for it.
b. ??Please don’t chop the kindling onto the rug.
38) a. Pat asked him into the room.
b. *Pat begged him into the room.
In order to explain (away) these seeming inconsistencies, Goldberg posits
a set of semantic constraints on the use of the construction.
3.1 a constraint on the causer
The causer can be an agent or a natural force, but it cannot be an in-
strument: hence the distinction between, say,
39) a. Max broke the vase into pieces (with a hammer).
b. *The hammer broke the vase into pieces. but
c. The hammer broke the vase.
40) a. *His cane helped him into the car. but
b. His cane helped him get around.
Note that instruments can be causative subjects (39c, 40b), but not in the
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caused motion construction; or so Goldberg argues.
3.2 constraints on direct causation
3.2.1 no mediating cognitive decision
‘No cognitive decision can mediate between the causing event and the
entailed [sic] motion’ (p.167). Hence
41) a. Sam coaxed Bob into the room.
b. *Sam encouraged Bob into the room. (G62)
The argument here is that coaxing (convincing, persuading, instructing),
while psychological, does not entail a cognitive decision on the part of the
coaxee. Encouraging (convincing, persuading), on the other hand, does,
and thus cannot enter into the caused motion construction. Goldberg ar-
gues, for instance, for a distinction between the acceptability of (42a) and
(42b) on this basis.
42) a. Sam frightened/coaxed/lured the mouse out of its hiding place.
b. ? Sam encouraged/convinced/persuaded the mouse to move out
of its hiding place. (G68, 69)
3.2.2 entailed motion
‘If motion is not strictly entailed, it must be presumed as a ceteris
paribus implication’ (p.168)
This constraint is intended to account for the acceptability of sentences
belonging to subclasses 34b and 34c above, where motion on the part of
the theme is not entailed. For instance,
43) a. John let Bill into the room.
b. Mary asked Bill into the room.
do not entail that Bill actually went into the room. Worse, they permit
a reading where Bill makes a cognitive decision, in violation of the no−
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cognitive−decision constraint. Goldberg gets out of this problem by saying
that, while there is not entailment of movement, movement is presumed
ceteris paribus. Thus, on the one hand, she contrasts
44) a. Sam asked Joe into the room.
b. *Sam begged Joe into the room (G79, 80)
where one cannot assume in the case of (44b) that Joe will enter the room.
And on the other, she contrasts
45) a. Sam asked Joe into the room.
b. #Sam asked Harry into the jail cell. (G82); again,
Goldberg doesn’t explain what # means.)
where one can assume, if anything, that Harry will not go into the cell.
3.2.3 conventionalized scenarios
‘Conventionalized scenarios can be cognitively packaged as a single
event even if an intervening cause exists’ (p.169)
This is not really a constraint, of course. Rather, it is a way to account
for the acceptability of certain sentences that express caused motion even
though the motion is not directly caused. Citing Shibatani (1973), Gold-
berg notes that causatives are possible even when the causation is indirect,
if the activity expressed is performed in a conventional way, as in (46−49)
(G84−87):
46) The invalid owner ran his favorite horse in the race.
47) Chris cut her hair [=had her hair cut] at the salon on University
Avenue.
48) She painted her house. [=had her house painted]
49) Farmer Joe grew those grape vines.
If the activity is not a conventional one, the caused motion construction
becomes impossible:
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50) ??Farmer Joe grew those vines onto his roof. (G88)
51) *The invalid owner ran his favorite horse onto the field.
On the other hand, (52) is possible because ‘paying for and arranging a
ticket for someone else are conventional ways to have someone travel for
interviews’ (p.169)
52) The company flew her to Chicago for an interview. (G90)
3.2.4 the effect of motion
‘‘If the action denoted by the verb implies an effect other than motion,
then a path of motion cannot be specified’ (p.170)
The purpose of this constraint is to account for the putative distinction
between two sets of verbs of forceful impact; specifically, those verbs whose
expressed motion affect the the object represented by the patient NP, and
those that don’t. Goldberg, following Fillmore (1970), thus recognizes a
strike−class (patient is affected) and a hit−class (patient not affected, other
than the effect of motion):
strike−class: strike, sock, assault, spank, clobber, slash, bludgeon,
impact, etc.
hit−class: hit, slap, smack, whack, knock, etc.
This distinction reflects the (un) acceptability of sentences like the follow-
ing:
53) a. *With an open hand, the toddler struck the tree.
b. The toddler struck his playmate. (G92a, b)
54) a. *The disgruntled player socked the wall.
b. The disgruntled player socked the coach.
c. *Joe assaulted/bludgeoned/impacted the steel block. (G93)
55) a. He hit/smacked/whacked/knocked the ball across the field.
b. *He struck/socked/spanked/clobbered/slashed the ball across the
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field. (G91)
The idea is that the tree, for instance, is not affected by the toddler’s ac-
tion, whereas his playmate is; strike evidently entails an effect on the pa-
tient other than a trajectory. Hence e.g.55b, which specifies a trajectory,
is unacceptable, while55a, which also specifies a trajectory, is OK because
the action does not affect the patient.
3.2.5change−of−state verbs
If the caused motion construction uses a change−of−state verb, how-
ever, the constraint on effect of motion is lifted: ‘If the activity causing the
change of state (or effect), when performed in the conventional way, effects
some incidental motion and, moreover, is performed with the intention
of causing the motion, then the path of motion may be specified’ (p.172).
The problem can be illustrated with sentences like the following (G
99−102, p.171):
56) The butcher sliced the salami onto the wax paper.
57) Joey clumped his potatoes into the middle of his plate.
58) Joey grated the cheese onto the serving plate.
59) Sam shredded the papers into the garbage pail.
The verbs in these sentences are evidently members of the strike−class;
that is, the actions affect the patient in some way other than, or in addi-
tion to, making the patient move. Thus they should be unacceptable, but
they aren’t. The out Goldberg provides is the putative conventionality and
intentionality of the actions. Thus, under normal circumstances, salami
slices or cheese gratings or paper shreds fall, etc.
Further, the actions expressed in (56−59) are intentional, and inten-
tionality is yet another constraint, as illustrated by the following contrasts
(G103, 104):
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60) a. *Sam unintentionally broke the eggs onto the floor.
(Does not mean Sam dropped the eggs or let them roll off the
table, etc.)
b. Sam carefully broke the eggs into the bowl.
61) a. ??Please don’t chop that kindling onto the rug.
b. Please chop that kindling into the bin provided for it.
One further qualification is that the change of state ‘must cause inci-
dental motion as a result, not that incidental motion is involved as ameans
of causing the change of state’ (p.172). It is this constraint, says Goldberg,
that makes the following unacceptable:
62) *She filled water into the tub. (G105)
63) *He covered the blanket over Mary. (G106)
3.2.6 path of motion
A final constraint on the caused motion construction is that ‘The path
of motion must be completely determined by the causal force’ (p.173). This
explains the difference between the sentences in (64):
64) a. *He nudged the ball down the incline. (OK if he nudged repeat-
edly)
b. He nudged the golf ball into the hole. (G107a, b)
The idea here is that with (64a), one nudge is not enough to get the ball
to the end of the incline; ‘gravity is necessary as an intermediary cause’
(p.172). Goldberg modifies Talmy’s (1976) distinction between ‘onset’ and
‘continuous’ causation by suggesting two types of ‘onset’ causation: where
the path of motion is fully determined (laugh off the stage, nudge into the
hole) and where it isn’t (laugh into the car, nudge down the hill).
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3.3 the load/spray alternation
Finally, Goldberg considers the so−called load/spray alternation, ex-
emplified in the following pairs:
65) a. Max sprayed paint on the statue.
b. Max sprayed the statue with paint.
66) a. Fred loaded bricks into the truck.
b. Fred loaded the truck with bricks.
Goldberg proposes that the (b) sentences are also examples of the caused
−motion construction. Following Pinker (1989), Goldberg recognizes five
narrowly defined verb classes that can occur in both constructions (p.176):
1. slather−class: ‘simultaneous forceful contact and motion of a mass
against a surface: slather, smear, brush, dab, daub, plaster, rub, smear,
smudge, spread, streak, ...
2. heap−class: vertical arrangement on a horizontal surface: heap,
pile, stack, ...
3. spray−class: force is imparted to a mass, causing ballistic motion
in a specified spatial distribution along a trajectory: spray, spatter, splash,
splatter, inject, sprinkle, squirt, ...
4. cram−class: mass is forced into a container against the limits of its
capacity: cram, pack, crowd, jam, stuff, ...
5. load−class: a mass of a size, shape, or type defined by the intended
use of a container is put into the container, enabling it to accomplish its
function: load, pack, stock, ...
According to Goldberg, verbs of the slather, heap, and cram classes require
all three arguments to be expressed, while the load class verbs can appear
without an overt theme; hence, for example,
67) a. Sam slathered shaving cream onto his face.
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b. Sam slathered his face with shaving cream.
c. *Sam slathered shaving cream.
d. *Sam slathered his face.
68) a. Pat heaped mashed potatoes onto her plate.
b. Pat heaped her plate with mashed potatoes.
c. Pat heaped mashed potatoes.
d. Pat heaped her plate.
69) a. Pat crammed the pennies into the jar.
b. Pat crammed the jar with pennies.
c. *Pat crammed the pennies.
d. *Pat crammed the jar. (G118−123)
70) a. She loaded the wagon with hay.
b. She loaded hay onto/into the wagon.
c. She loaded the truck. (G124, 126)
3.4 Problems with the analysis
Goldberg argues that the caused−motion construction is ‘required in
the grammar’ in order ‘to account for certain cases in which the semantic
interpretation cannot plausibly be attributed to the main verb and other
means of deriving the semantics compositionally[sic]also fail’ (p.152). Of
course, a lot rides on that ‘compositionally’; after all, Fodor might be right
that English doesn’t have a compositional semantics, at least in the sense
Goldberg seems to have in mind. It’s worth entertaining the idea, at least,
that interpretations of English expressions are, in fact, abductive, and
that accounting for the data Goldberg presents can be done, and indeed
needs to be done, by appealing to pragmatic considerations.
Goldberg recognizes that some have attempted to palm off the inter-
pretive work on pragmatics, but, she claims, ‘...there is a general problem
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with attempts to account for caused−motion and resultative expressions
by means of a simple concatenation of two independently existing predi-
cates, the semantic interpretation being arrived at by general pragmatic
principles. Such analyses do not account for the fact that such concatena-
tion is allowed in the language in the first place’ (p.157). No doubt she’s
right; but then again, it’s not clear that a construction account of caused
−motion will explain why the construction is possible, either. It’s hardly
an explanation to say that the concatenation of, say, sneeze with off the
table is possible because of the caused−motion construction; the caused−
motion construction just is the concatenation that yields the expression
‘sneezed X off the table’. Sentences like (28−33) are evidently not possible
in Romance, Semitic, or Polynesian languages, while they evidently are
in Chinese and Dutch, as well as English (Talmy1985, cited by Goldberg,
p.155). Why this should be is an interesting question, to which, so far
as I know and pace Goldberg, there is as yet no answer.
3.4.1constraints on the construction
In any case, Goldberg proposes a set of constraints on the construc-
tion, constraints the violation of which lead to ungrammaticality. In fact,
none of the constraints succeeds. They fail to rule out some sentences,
and rule out sentences that are perfectly acceptable.
3.4.1.1 instruments
To start with, why should it be the case, if it is the case, that instru-
ments are not possible causes in this construction? There are languages
that restrict causative subjects to agents―― Japanese, for example――
but then one could argue that AGENT is a natural kind in grammar. But
how do agents AND natural forces forma a natural class? And in any case,
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it seems quite easy to think of caused−motion sentences where the causer
is, in fact, an instrument, in violation of the putative constraint:
71) a. The falling broom knocked the vase onto the floor. cf.
b. *The hammer broke the vase onto the floor. (G60b.)
72) His coattails spilled the drink onto the rug.
73) The sludge backed the water up to the rim of the sink.
74) a. *His cane helped him into the car. (G61a.)
b. His cane helped him down the road/up the stairs.
75) His divining rod sent/led him to the tree.
I don’t particularly like (71b) or (74a) either, although I don’t see why they
should be called ungrammatical; indeed, in the absence of a grammatical
constraint, I don’t see how they can be called ungrammatical. I suspect
the problem lies elsewhere. For instance, I’m not happy with (76), either,
although it should be unexceptional on Goldberg’s account.
76) Fred broke the vase onto the floor.
And (77) seems fine, too.
77) His cane helped him into the bus.
In other words, the problem with (74a) could simply be that it’s hard to
see how a cane could help one into a sitting position, where it’s easy to
see how it could help one step up into a bus. And if replacing an instrument
in (71b) by an agent in (76) doesn’t help, it may be because the problem
lies somewhere else; for instance, in the inappropriateness of directional
onto with the verb break, which doesn’t normally implicate directionality
(the specific action of breaking eggs is an exception; see below).
3.4.1.2 cognitive decision
The distinction here strikes me as simply bogus. In what sense is be-
ing successfully coaxed, as opposed to successfully encouraged, not mak-
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ing a cognitive decision? Evidently Goldberg thinks mice can be coaxed
but not encouraged; fine, but what about, say, (78)?
78) With a raft of subtle arguments, coupled with appeals to his pride,
she coaxed him out of the closet.
In short, the distinction, or constraint, offered here is purely post hoc.
On the other hand, there’s a fairly neat way to class these various
verbs syntactically, i.e. in terms of their complement types:
coax/lure/frighten/talk ... NP into NP/into Ving/*to V
encourage/convince/persuade... NP *into NP/*into Ving/to V
Whatever the basis for this distinction, it obviates the need to posit a spe-
cial semantic constraint on the construction.
3.4.1.3 entailed motion
Goldberg offers the following putative contrast:
79) Sam asked Joe into the room.
80) *Sam begged Joe into the room.
81) *Sam pleaded Joe into the room. (G79−81)
She claims that in the case of beg or plead , ‘motion cannot be presumed’
(p.168). Evidently it can in the case of ask, but why should this be? Af-
ter all, if Sam asked Joe to come into the room, and his speech act was
successful, then Joe came into the room; ditto for begged and pleaded .
So there doesn’t seem to be a reason to block (80) and (81) on semantic
grounds.
But here again, there are syntactic differences among the three verbs:
82) Sam asked/begged/*pleaded her.
83) Sam asked/begged/*pleaded her to leave.
84) Sam asked/begged/*pleaded a favor of her.
85) Sam asked of her/begged of her/*pleaded of her that ...
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86) Sam’s *ask?/*beggary?/plea that she leave
Note that these distinctions have to be learned by an English−speaker in
any case, irrespective of whether there is a caused−motion construction.
Hence any posited construction seems to be totally otiose.
3.4.1.4 indirect causation
Given the ‘no mediating cognitive decision’ constraint, causatives
should be unacceptable in this construction. But, as with (87), they can
be perfectly fine, as Goldberg notes:
87) The company flew her to Chicago for an interview. (G90)
88) *The invalid owner ran his favorite horse onto the field. (G89)
What makes (87) licit but (88) illicit is that the former represents a conven-
tional way of arranging for an interview, while the latter is not a conven-
tional way of running a horse onto a field. I find the distinction totally
unconvincing. For instance, the following are surely as acceptable as (87):
89) The company flew her to Chicago for/an appendectomy/an assigna-
tion / the hell of it.
3.4.1.5 completely determined motion
Goldberg attempts to justify this constraint by appealing to a distinc-
tion made by Fillmore (1970),between whether the patient of the verb is
‘affected’ or not. What counts as affecting, of course, is never specified,
but it would seem that hit, slap, smack, whack, knock are in the hit−class,
which do not ‘affect’ the relevant entity, while sock, spank, clobber, slash,
bludgeon are in the strike−class, and do. ‘All of the verbs of the strike−
class require that the impacted entity be affected’ (Goldberg p.170). The
distinction allows Goldberg to account for such putative OK/* pairs as the
following:
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90) a. He hit the ball across the field.
b. *He struck the ball across the field. (G91a, b)
91) a. *With an open hand, the toddler struck the tree.
b. The toddler struck his playmate. (G92a, b)
92) a. *The disgruntled player socked the wall.
b. The disgruntled player socked the coach. (G93a, b)
Now, I see no way to justify the asterisks on the above, but in any case
consider, say, the following:
93) Max socked the volleyball into the net.
94) Max spanked a line drive past the shortstop.
95) Max punched the ball out of the rough onto the green.
No doubt socking a wall won’t affect the wall, while socking a coach or
a volleyball will affect the sockees; but surely that’s because of the nature
of the sockee, not because of some property of the act of socking. Which
is to say the distinction between hit verbs and strike verbs is purely arbi-
trary.
To take one final example, Goldberg finds (96) unacceptable (on the
interpretation that the bullet caused Sam to move across the room).
96) *Pat shot Sam across the room. (G98)
This is because ‘if the bullet is understood to penetrate Sam, then Sam
is necessarily affected in a way that does not involve motion, and so a path
of motion cannot be specified’ (p.170). But in that case, we would have
to reject (97) on the interpretation where the arrow penetrated the apple
and carried it across the town square:
97) William Tell shot the apple across the town square.
What’s wrong with (96) is not semantics, it’s physics; it’s just very hard
to conceive of a bullet having the force to carry a human body across a
room. But it’s not hard to conceive of a bullet carrying a body a foot or two:
Where Do Constructional Meanings Come From?
－４７－
98) Pat shot Sam off the landing.
3.4.1.6 change of state verbs
As indicated above (3.2.4), verbs of impact that affect the impacted
entity cannot specify the path of motion. But change of state verbs such
as slice, grate do affect the impacted entity, yet can specify path of motion.
Thus (56−59), repeated here as (99−102):
99) The butcher sliced the salami onto the wax paper.
100) Joey clumped his potatoes into the middle of his plate.
101) Joey grated the cheese onto serving plate.
102) Sam shredded the papers into the garbage pail. (G99−102)
To save the constraint, Goldberg stipulates that with these change−of−
state verbs, the action ‘typically implies some predictable incidental mo-
tion. ... It is the path of this incidental motion that can be specified by the
directional....[I]n order to account for these cases, we have to appeal ... to
the conventional scenario associated with the particular act denoted by the
verb’ (p.171). But this clearly won’t work: If clumping potatoes entails
movement, so does striking a ball, and yet Goldberg marks (100) as OK,
while rejecting (90b). And (103) is perfectly fine, although it hardly rep-
resents a conventional action
103) Sam grated the cheese onto his knees.
Nor, finally, is intentionality a necessary factor. The problem of inten-
tionality does arise with sentences like (99−102), but without any reference
to the caused−motion construction; slicing, grating, shredding, (transi-
tively) melting, etc. are, normally, intentional actions. So is breaking
an egg, at least when it’s done in cooking. Thus e.g. (60), repeated here
as (104) is unacceptable, but not because of the caused−motion construc-
tion;
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104) *Sam unintentionally broke the eggs onto the floor.
105) *Sam unintentionally grated the cheese/sliced the salami/climbed
the ladder ...
3.4.1.7 path of motion
The distinction between the unacceptable (64a) and the acceptable (64
b) ―― repeated here as (106) ―― is, according to Goldberg, that in the
former ‘the causal force initiated by the agent argument in this case does
not in itself determine the path of motion: gravity is necessary as an inter-
mediary cause’ (p.172).
106) a. *He nudged the ball down the incline.
b. He nudged the golf ball into the hole.
Just why gravity doesn’t play a similar role in the other sentence is beyond
me. By the same token, mere slicing of a salami is not enough to get the
slices to fall on to the wax paper; you need gravity, and yet the salami sen-
tence is perfectly OK. Or consider (107).
107) Sam pushed Bill off the bridge onto a passing freighter.
Is the path from the bridge to the freighter determined by Sam’s pushing?
I have no idea, but if it is, then the path down the incline is also determined
by a single nudge, and if it isn’t, then Goldberg’s constraint is mistaken.
Note that one could just as easily say Sam pushed Bill onto a passing
freighter.
3.4.2 the load/spray alternation
3.4.2.1 Pinker’s verb classes
Goldberg follows Pinker in classifying verbs that participate in the
load/spray alternation. But if these verb classes are to do any interesting
work, they should, at least ceteris paribus, be natural classes; i.e., they
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should include all and only the verbs so classified. On the face of it, for
instance, it’s hard to see how or why there should even be, say, a slather
−class, but if there were one, it’s hard to see how all the verbs putatively
in the class qualify for membership. It’s hard, for instance, to see how
dabbing or smudging can be characterized as ‘forceful contact’ or as ‘motion
of a mass against a surface’. And on the other hand, there are other verbs
that clearly do express forceful contact and motion against a surface, but
that somehow do not qualify. If I fling mud against a wall, that’s forceful
contact, surely, and the mud will move. The same goes for grinding a sur-
face with pumice. And yet
108) a. Max flung mud onto the wall/*the wall with mud.
b. Max ground *pumice on the surface/the surface with pumice.
(cf. rub)
c. Max waxed/mopped/polished the floor with Turtle Wax.
d. *Max waxed/mopped/polished Turtle Wax on (to) the floor.
And even some slather verbs that do alternate don’t seem to alternate in
line with the putative caused−motion construction, which is supposed to
mean ‘caused motion’, after all. That is, the motion is not directional but
locational. Take rub:
109) a. He rubbed the stain with the sponge.
b. He rubbed the sponge *onto/on the stain.
110) a. He rubbed the meat with garlic.
b. He rubbed garlic *onto/on/into the meat.
3.4.2.2 constraints on the classes
The claim is that for the slather−, heap−, and cram−classes, all three
participant roles be expressed, as in the shaving cream examples. But
there are numerous exceptions to this putative constraint.
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111) a. Sam brushed his teeth with toothpaste.
b. Sam brushed his teeth.
112) a. ?Max plastered the wall with plaster.
b. Max plastered the wall.
113) a. Max streaked his hair with henna.
b. Max streaked his hair.
114) a. Max smudged the paper with his thumb.
b. Max smudged the paper.
115) a. ?Pat packed her bags with clothes.
b. Pat packed her bags.
c. Pat packed her clothes (into the bags).
Packing clothes, as opposed to packing theaters, may be a load−class verb,
so instead, how about
116) a. Pat overpacked her bags with clothes.
b. Pat overpacked her bags.
c. Pat overpacked her clothes into the bags.
d. Pat overpacked her clothes.
For the load−class, Goldberg says that the agent and the container
arguments are obligatory, while the loaded them argument is not, pro-
vided that the theme is a definite null complement. Thus Goldberg declares
(117) questionable, while (118) is OK if speaker and hearer know what
was loaded.
117) ??Sam loaded the hay. (G125b.)
118) Sam loaded the truck. (G126)
But this is simply wrong:
119) Sam worked all day loading hay/trucks/blickets.
Note that if, as is likely, you don’t know what a blicket is, the sentence
is ambiguous.
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Clearly, (117) seems infelicitous, but then so does (118), although
not for the reason Goldberg suggests. The problem arises, not from any
constraint on the construction, but from general Gricean principles. the
source of the problem is the definite article: the conventionally implicates
something like ‘known to the hearer’. In the absence of any contextual in-
formation, as in the case of an example sentence in a linguistics paper,
either sentence invites the expectation of continuing with new informa-
tion, namely the container in (117) or the theme in (118). In either case,
if that respective information is in the context, the sentence is fine; if not,
not.
120) a. I watched the longshoremen as they loaded a ship.
b. I watched the longshoremen as they loaded cargo.
121) a. I watched the farmworkers as they loaded a truck.
b. I watched the farmworkers as they loaded hay.
3.4.2.3 holism
Along with many others, Goldberg notes that the with version of load
/spray sentences carry an implication of completeness, or holism:
122) a. He loaded bricks into the truck.
b. He loaded the truck with bricks.
123) a. He sprayed paint onto the statue.
b. He sprayed the statue with paint.
In the (b) versions, the implication is that the truck is fully loaded, and
that the statue is completely covered ―― or, if not completely, at least
sufficiently to count as defaced; ‘affected’, as they say. This does seem to
be generally the case. Still, it’s one thing to note a holistic implication;
it’s quite another thing to claim that the holism follows from the construc-
tion itself, qua construction.
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For starters, note that load/spray sentences without a with−phrase
have the same holistic implication:
124) a. He loaded the truck.
b. He sprayed the statue.
Which strongly suggests that the caused−motion construction is not the
crucial factor in inviting the holistic interpretation.
Worse, the holistic implication in (124) is no different from what is
implied by a vast number of transitive verbs:
125) a. He ate the cookie. −−−> the whole cookie
b. He danced the tango. −−−> a whole number
c. She greeted the guests. −−−> all the guests
d. She watched the movie. −−−> the whole movie
These effects are not, however, contributed by some ‘monotransitive con-
struction’; they are normal implicatures in the Gricean sense, and as such
they’re cancellable:
126) a. He ate the cookie, but left the filling.
b. He dance the tango for the first few bars.
c. She greeted the guests, or some of them, at least.
d. She watched the movie, but fell asleep halfway through.
Holism, in other words, doesn’t follow from transitivity generally,
any more than it follows from the caused−motion construction specifically.
It follows from (specific) verbs in (specific) contexts. Given the facts of eco-
nomics, it’s natural to assume that a loaded truck is a more or less fully
loaded truck; but that’s a fact of life, not of meaning or grammar. If all
the furniture I own is two chairs and a table, and the moving men come
and put them in a huge van and drive away, they’ve loaded the van. If
I put one bullet into my six−shooter, it’s a loaded gun, and no appeal to
the caused−motion construction will convince the police otherwise. If I
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ate a cookie there’s probably no cookie left, but if I ate an apple the core
and some of the flesh are still there. And so on.
4. Conclusion
We have looked, in painful detail, at Goldberg’s account of two syn-
tactic structures ―― constructions ―― in English, and have seen that
the account fails across the board. There seems to be no way to attribute
a basic meaning to either the caused movement construction or the ditran-
sitive construction; and as we have seen, Goldberg is forced to add puta-
tive constraints, provisos, and stipulations that themselves do not hold
up to scrutiny. Granted, these are just two constructions, but they are
parade cases for the construction grammar position; they are major syntac-
tic structures of English, and they are abstract and thus have no phonetic
form. If these can’t be analyzed as Goldberg wishes, I doubt that other
major, abstract syntactic structures of English can, either. And on the
other hand, it is of little moment whether more traditional constructions
such as the ‘way−construction’ (danced his way across the room, etc.) or
the ‘more, the merrier construction’ are amenable to a Construction Gram-
mar analysis, since that would not obviate the need for a syntactic level
in the grammar.
Of course, the problems that construction grammar was intended to
solve remain: We need to explain how it is that an intransitive verb like
sneeze, say, can be used transitively in sentences likeMax sneezed the foam
off the beer even though *Max sneezed the foam is not possible, or why
we can say Fred gave Mary a cold but not *Fred gave a cold to Mary.
My guess is that we will need various answers, but in any case my goal
here has been a purely negative one: Claiming that syntactic structures
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are meaning−bearing items like words and phrases will not help to explain
why language is the way it is or how it is that we can acquire it.
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